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Middle-status Conformity Revisited: 
The Interplay between Achieved and Ascribed Status  
 
Abstract 
 
Decisions about conforming to or deviating from conventional practices in a 
field is an important concern of organization and management theory. The 
position that actors occupy in the status hierarchy has been shown to be an 
important determinant of these decisions. The dominant hypothesis, known 
as middle-status-conformity, posits that middle-status actors are more likely 
to conform to conventional practices than high- and low-status actors do. We 
challenge this hypothesis by revisiting its fundamental assumptions and 
developing a theory where actors’ propensity to conform based on their 
achieved status further depends on their ascribed status that actors inherit 
from their social group. Specifically, we propose that middle-status 
conformity applies only to actors who have a sense of security, based on their 
high ascribed status. For actors with low ascribed status, we propose that 
high-and low-status actors show greater conformity than middle-status actors. 
We test our hypotheses using data from the U.S. symphony orchestras from 
1918 to 1969. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Actors, whether as individuals or organizations, face a fundamental trade-off in the 
social contexts they operate in: on the one hand, conforming to conventional practices 
facilitates their acceptance as legitimate players (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984; Stinchcombe, 1965), whereas, on the other hand, deviating from such practices 
might help them gain an advantage over others (Deephouse, 1999; see Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, 
& Miller, 2017 for a review). Thus, actors strive to find the level of “reconciliation of opposing 
needs for assimilation and differentiation from others” (Brewer, 1991: 475) that their audience 
finds optimal (Askin & Mauskapf, 2017; Zhao, Ishihara, Jennings, & Lounsbury, 2018). In 
their endeavor to balance these countervailing pressures, however, actors should consider that 
their degree of conformity is assessed differently depending on their individual characteristics 
(e.g., Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000; Thomas-Hunt & Phillips, 2011). Actors’ position in the 
status hierarchy plays a pivotal role in this respect (Ridgeway, 1978; Durand & Kremp, 2016; 
Phillips, Turco, & Zuckerman, 2013; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001).  
The dominant perspective in the literature that relates status positions to conformity 
suggests that middle-status actors conform more (or deviate less) than actors who are low- or 
high-status, resulting in inverted-U-shaped relationship (Durand & Kremp, 2016; Phillips & 
Zuckerman, 2001). Even though middle-status-conformity is commonly invoked in scholarly 
dialogue as the default expectation, it explicitly builds on a set of scope conditions. Specifically, 
it builds on “assumptions about the social-psychological dispositions characteristic of low- and 
high-status actors, which parallel assumptions about their structural positions” (Phillips & 
Zuckerman, 2001: 388). These assumptions are that the status hierarchy is relatively stable, so 
that high-status actors can feel entitled to deviate without being subject to penalties, and that 
there is a proximate alternative audience that low-status actors can feasibly turn to, so that low-
status actors feel less anxious of being on the periphery of a focal audience’s attention and 
accordingly freer to take the risk of deviating in the eyes of this focal audience.  
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As Phillips and Zuckerman acknowledge, these scope conditions imply “a rather 
narrow range of contexts in which it is appropriate to expect a curvilinear relationship between 
status and conformity” (2001: 382). Thus, “the ultimate validation of the proposed framework 
should come only when the proposed scope conditions are transformed into contextual 
variables and are then tested for their implied interaction with the IUS [inverted-U-shaped] 
curve.” (2001: 420). Despite this emphasis to heed the theory’s scope conditions, however, 
research has rarely further investigated or validated these conditions, and has instead applied 
the middle-status-conformity hypothesis as it is, to find, for example, that it affects different 
types of conformity (Durand & Kremp, 2016) or different types of behavior (Perretti & Negro, 
2006).  
We depart from extant literature by uncovering more parsimonious conditions that 
shape the social-psychological dispositions toward conformity. Moreover, instead of focusing 
exclusively on the conditions that yield an inverted-U-shaped relationship between status and 
conformity, we advance the literature by exploring the conditions under which the middle-
status conformity hypothesis does not apply and in fact a different relational form is to be 
expected. We do so by drawing insights from the resurging interest on multiple status 
hierarchies (Jensen & Wang, 2018; Kovács & Liu, 2016; Zhao & Zhou, 2011) and from the 
distinction between ascribed status—the status that actors inherit based on their association to 
groups due to nominal characteristics such as gender, race, or country of origin —and achieved 
status—the status that actors receive based on their own individual accomplishments (Linton, 
1936; Thomas-Hunt & Phillips, 2011). Specifically, we argue that a diffuse status characteristic 
such as ascribed status filters the extent to which individuals feel secure or excluded based on 
their social position and modulates the dispositions towards conformity that are formed on the 
basis of achieved status. Hence, we develop a theory which proposes that middle-status-
conformity is a special case, rather than a universal case. 
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Our theory suggests that ascribed status either cements (when it is high) or undermines 
(when it is low) the sense of security brought by high-achieved status; and either reinforces 
(when it is low) or mitigates (when it is high) the sense of exclusion caused by low-achieved 
status. Hence, we do not expect that all high-achieved status actors will muster the confidence 
to adopt nonconformist behavior: those with high-ascribed status will feel secure enough to 
deviate without fear of serious consequence, whereas those with low-ascribed status will be 
likely to be more cautious so as not to expose and undermine their status-inconsistent standing. 
Similarly, nor do we expect that all low-achieved status actors will accept the risk to deviate: 
whereas low-achieved status actors with high-ascribed status can leverage their inherited 
legitimacy to behave unconventionally with little risk, low-achieved status actors with low-
ascribed status will be more likely to adopt conformist behavior to reduce the risk of being 
further marginalized. These dispositions (toward deviance in the case of low- and high-status 
actors in the high-ascribed group, and toward conformity for low- and high-status actors in the 
low-ascribed group) will be mitigated for those in the middle of the achieved status hierarchy, 
so that, overall, we expect that the relationship between status and conformity for high-ascribed 
status actors is inverted-U-shaped, whereas for low-ascribed status actors it is U-shaped. 
We test our hypotheses in the context of U.S. symphony orchestras between 1918 and 
1969. Consistent with our predictions, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
achieved status and conformity among conductors with high-ascribed status (i.e., German or 
Austrian conductors). In contrast, we find a U-shaped relationship between achieved status and 
conformity among actors without high-ascribed status (non-German and non-Austrian 
conductors).  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Research in sociology and management has shown that benefits accrue to actors, be 
they individuals or organizations, for the status positions that they occupy. Actors that achieve 
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greater status gain access to resources at a lower cost (Podolny, 1993), have more leeway in 
deviant behavior (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001), benefit from greater effort from their exchange 
partners (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010), and receive more credit for their achievements (Merton, 
1968). Because of the numerous benefits that status brings, actors aspire to enhance their status 
(Askin & Bothner, 2016), while at the same time behave in ways to ensure that they will not 
lose the status they have achieved (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001). One of the 
mechanisms through which actors can gain or maintain status is by showing conformist or 
deviant behavior (Hollander, 1958; Ridgeway, 1978). The psychological dispositions inducing 
an actor to favor risky deviance over safe conformity, however, themselves depend on the 
position that this individual occupies in the status hierarchy (Fast & Joshi, 2014). Middle-
status-conformity theory (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001) suggests that the dispositions to take 
the risk to deviate (in an attempt to preserve or enhance one’s status) are highest for low- and 
high-status actors, thus making middle-status actors comparatively more conformist. 
Even if widely accepted in the scholarly dialogue as the standard expectation for the 
relationship between status and conformity, the theory of middle-status conformity hinges on 
a set of restrictive, and typically overlooked, scope conditions about the status structure that 
are needed to trigger the assumed socio-psychological orientations. First, it is assumed that 
“the status structure in question is sufficiently stable such that it confers security on high-status 
players and frees them to deviate” (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 388). At the same time, it is 
also expected that, “while the status structure must be highly stable for the inverted U-shaped 
relationship to emerge, it cannot be so stable that there is no mobility, especially in a downward 
direction. If downward mobility were not an expected consequence of nonconformity there 
would be little reason for middle-status candidates to conform” (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 
389). Finally, even though it is assumed that “the lowest status actors are relatively permanent 
outsiders, such that they cease to identify with the interface” (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 
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388), at the same time it is expected that these low status actors can find an alternative interface 
(i.e., audience) with which to identify, that “lessen [their] anxiety about being on the periphery 
of a focal audience’s attention” (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 420). However, “[u]nless 
alternative audiences are available, low-status outsiders have little choice but to redouble their 
efforts to signal membership through greater conformity” (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 389).  
Thus, the scope conditions we reference above (and others that are spelled out in the 
original article) limit the applicability of the middle-status-conformity theory to a narrow set 
of contexts. Nonetheless, the original framework continues to offer important insights that can 
be elaborated further to develop a more general theory of how status affects conformity. In the 
original framework, the deviance of low-status actors is premised on the presence of an 
alternative audience that alleviates the anxiety of being low status with respect to the focal 
audience. However, this reasoning implicitly assumes that these actors are not low status in the 
eyes of the alternative audience as well. If these low-status actors are also low status in the eyes 
of the alternative audience, they would be permanent outsiders for both audiences they might 
face, as a result of which their anxiety would increase rather than decrease. Hence, in this 
situation, low-status actors might be likely to conform even further, rather than to deviate.  
Moreover, the presence of an alternative audience (and the status ranking in this 
audience) might affect not only low-status actors but also high-status ones. For example, the 
sense of security that an actor has acquired by achieving high status in the eyes of an audience 
can be undermined if another audience deems the actor as low status. In this scenario, the high-
status actor might be prone to conform rather than deviate. This extended reasoning has 
implications for middle-status actors as well. As Phillips and Zuckerman themselves note: “A 
middle-status candidate may not conform to a particular audience’s expectations if she is 
oriented toward a different audience – perhaps one where she has achieved greater success” 
(Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 388). Therefore, a joint consideration of the different status 
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positions that an actor occupies in different status rankings can yield a more general theory 
about the relationship between status and conformity. 
It is important to emphasize that in studying how multiple status rankings affect 
conformity, we do not invoke – as Phillips and Zuckerman do – the presence or absence of 
different audiences (see Ertug, Yogev, Lee, & Hedstrom, 2016 for a study of multiple 
audiences). As Philips and Zuckerman also note, the assumed presence of two different 
audiences between which an actor can easily switch is a rather restrictive scope condition that 
limits the applicability of the theory. In developing our theory, we shift the focus from the 
context-specific structural features that characterize status rankings to the two most general 
forms of status on which actors are ranked by their main audience, namely ascribed and 
achieved status. Linton (1936: 115), who coined the two terms, defined “ascribed status” as 
“assigned to individuals without reference to their innate differences or abilities” and “achieved 
status” as “requiring special qualities” and “open to individual achievement.” Thus, ascribed 
status is typically characterized as an “indelible” (Galtung, 1964: 101) or “irreversible” 
(Schnore, 1961: 412) dimension that is defined by an “accident of birth” (Foladare, 1969: 53). 
Achieved status is instead a “delible”, or “reversible” dimension that allows for social mobility 
by means of “performance or effort or volition” (Foladare, 1969: 53). 
Ascribed status is not under an individual actor’s control because it is given to him/her 
based on the status of the social group with which the actor shares some nominal characteristic 
inherited at birth, such as gender, race, or country of origin. The status of such social groups is 
formed through a process of status belief diffusion. This diffusion originates from the 
interaction between members of two groups with different nominal characteristics, where one 
of these groups own, possibly by chance, a superior exchangeable resource (Ridgeway, 1991) 
or some other consensually valued object or characteristic—for example, physical 
attractiveness, years of education, skill in mathematics, public speaking, or athletics (Berger & 
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Fisek, 2006; Jasso, 2001; Webster & Hysom, 1998). As the credence that the nominal 
characteristic is associated to the valued characteristic propagates, so as to form widely-shared 
status beliefs in society (see Ridgeway, 1991 and Ridgeway & Correll, 2006 for different 
mechanisms through which these beliefs can diffuse), they become “part of the cultural 
stereotypes of the categorical groups involved and add a distinctive evaluative component to 
those stereotypes [Fiske et al., 2002]” (Ridgeway & Correll, 2006: 433).  
Different stereotypes about worthiness and competence become salient in different 
settings (Berger & Webster, 2006), including stereotypical evaluations based on country or 
geographical region of origin. For example, research has suggested that Hispanic Americans 
(Nadler & Clark, 2011) and African Americans (Steele & Aronson, 1995) experience negative 
stereotypes in academic contexts, whereas Asian immigrants enjoy a positive one (e.g., Shih, 
Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999). Research also shows that African-Americans experience positive 
stereotypes in rap music and basketball, but are negatively evaluated in the Senate and 
corporate America, whereas Mexicans enjoy a positive stereotype in Tejano Music (Inman, 
Huerta, & Oh 1998). The relevance of country or region-based stereotypes is also evident for 
products and organizations. At the product level, research in marketing has shown that 
consumers use information on a product’s country-of-origin to make inferences about its 
quality, regardless of whether they are familiar with the product (Han, 1989). More broadly, 
some companies and their products or services might be perceived as more “authentic” and as 
having superior status in a specific domain of competence, based on their geographical origin. 
For example, Scottish whisky producers (McKendrick & Hannan, 2013), French (Ody-Brasier 
& Vermeulen, 2014), and Napa Valley wine producers (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999) are 
typically ascribed superior status on the basis of their geographical origin.  
Many country-based stereotypes associated to individuals—as well as to 
organizations—that persist today originated decades, if not centuries, ago in nations that, at the 
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time, owned or invested in superior resources in a specific domain of competence and gave 
birth to exceptional masters or organizations that are renown worldwide in that domain. The 
persistence of such beliefs is due to the fact that once a widely-shared status belief about the 
worthiness of the social group in a setting is institutionalized, it is difficult for a single actor to 
change it (Bettencourt et al., 2001; Fiske, 2010).  
As Ridgeway (2014: 5) has argued “because individuals expect others to judge them 
according to these beliefs, they must take status beliefs into account in their own behavior, 
whether or not they personally endorse them.” Thus, “these implicit status biases shape both 
the ‘supply side’ and the ‘demand side’ of people’s everyday efforts to achieve the resources 
and positions of power by which we gauge material inequality. Status biases affect the 
confidence and energy with which people put themselves forward in a situation. When status 
beliefs are implicitly salient, they bias people’s expectations for their own and the other’s 
competence and suitability for authority in a situation.” (Ridgeway 2014: 5). However, we 
propose that these feelings might be manifest differently based on the status that the individual 
has achieved on her/his own. Similarly, an actors’ sense of security or exclusion, as based on 
their position in the achieved status hierarchy, is likely to be filtered by the status that they have 
inherited. Therefore, a joint consideration of ascribed and achieved status is needed to make 
further progress in understanding how status affects conformity. 
To study the change of dispositions toward conformity as actors from low- or high-
ascribed status groups climb the (achieved) status hierarchy, we build on the insight that 
individuals set different reference points when they engage in risky behavior (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Mitra, Jenkins, Gupta & Shaw, 2015). Management research suggests that two 
reference points are important in decision making with respect to such behavior: the survival 
point, which is associated with preserving continued participation in the field (Moliterno, Beck, 
Beckman, & Meyer, 2014) and the aspiration point, which is associated with the desire to 
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enhance one’s status (Boyle & Shapira, 2012). Greater attention to the survival point prompts 
threat-rigidity and leads actors toward safe, conforming behavior (Audia & Greve, 2006; Staw, 
Lance, & Dutton, 1981). Attention to the aspiration point, conversely, prompts riskier and bold 
actions that can end up enabling actors to climb the social hierarchy. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
We explore the implications of how ascribed status might channel the attention of actors 
towards a survival or an aspiration point as they climb the status hierarchy in the four ideal-
typical configurations in Table 1: two where an actor’s achieved and ascribed status are 
consistent (quadrant 2 and 3) and two where they are inconsistent (quadrant 1 and 4). In the 
two status-consistent positions, the actor will be either unambiguously low status or 
unambiguously high status. In both cases, the actor will be subject to relatively clear and strong 
social expectations (McCranie & Kimberly, 1973), but whereas in the unambiguously low-
status case, the actor will be exposed to expectations towards conformity; in the unambiguously 
high-status case, the actor will be susceptible to expectations of deviance. In the two status-
inconsistent positions, the actor will instead face conflicting expectations that will be resolved 
differently depending on whether the status dimension that is lagging behind is the one that the 
actor cannot change, i.e. ascribed status. We discuss these cases in detail below. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Status and conformity among members of high-ascribed status groups 
We start by considering actors who are members of a high-ascribed status group. Our 
leading assumption is that these actors will anchor their assessments of their achieved status 
on the expectations that are linked to their high-status reference group, and will base their 
decision to conform or deviate on the degree of (in-)consistency between their achieved status 
and the status of their ascribed group. We elaborate on the implications of this for each of the 
three cases (low-, middle-, and high-status actors).  
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Low-status actors from high-ascribed status groups. Quadrant 1 in Table 1 
characterizes actors who are associated with a high-ascribed status group but who have not yet 
achieved high individual status. This situation yields an inconsistency between the two status 
dimensions. Research has shown that status inconsistency generates anxiety (Jackson, 1962; 
Stryker & Macke, 1978). In this particular case, in which the inconsistency (and the resulting 
anxiety) can be resolved by enhancing the status dimension that is malleable (i.e., achieved 
status), we expect that actors will be likely to engage in riskier, less conventional behavior.  
Unconventional behavior has the potential to bring positive returns and rewards. By 
attracting audience attention (Ridgeway & Jacobson, 1977), behavior that does not conform to 
what is typically performed by others is likely to make the actor stand out and gain credit for 
unconventional choices, if these choices are deemed valuable by the audience. High potential 
returns, however, are often accompanied by higher risk. In cases where the unconventional 
behavior ends up being negatively valued by the audience, the actor can face penalties for such 
bold choices, which might even be considered misconduct (Benner, 2010; Hong et al., 2000). 
The risks that are associated with unconventional behavior, however, are reduced for 
individuals from high-status groups, including those individuals from these groups who have 
low individual status. 
All else being equal, actors from high-status groups receive more favorable evaluations 
(Foschi, 2000), and are also less likely to be penalized for deviant behavior by their audiences 
(Giordano, 1983; Ridgeway, 1991; Sharkey, 2014).1 This is because, despite their individual 
low status, actors who are members of a high-status group inherit legitimacy in the field for 
their mere affiliation to a high-status category (Ridgeway, 1991; Thomas-Hunt & Phillips, 
2011). This category-lent legitimacy has two consequences that are pertinent for the 
                                                 
1 Recent studies have refined this to suggest that high-status actors get more punished once a deviant behavior is 
unambiguously considered as illegitimate (Graffin, Bundy, Porac, Wade, & Quinn, 2013) or as an act of betrayal 
(Phillips et al., 2013). 
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dispositions of low-status actors with respect to conformity. On the one hand, it reduces the 
anxiety that might otherwise be related to low individual status, and thereby mitigates the 
associated fear to be excluded from the consideration set of an audience. On the other hand, 
however, it increases one’s anxiety of not having achieved what might be expected of oneself 
based on membership to a high-status group, and thus reinforce the wish to demonstrate 
deserving and rightful membership to the high-status reference group. The former condition 
(that is, the reduced anxiety that might be tied to the risk of exclusion) suggests that, especially 
when compared with low-status actors from low-status groups, low-status actors from high-
status groups will be less attentive to the “survival point”2 (i.e., to establish or maintain their 
continued participation in the field) and therefore be less subject to threat-rigidity that might 
produce safe, conforming behavior. The second condition (that is, the increase in anxiety that 
is linked to the inconsistency between achieved and ascribed status) suggests that low-status 
actors from high-status groups will turn instead their attention to the “aspiration point” of 
enhancing their status so as to establish consistency with that of their group, and thereby behave 
in bolder ways that might allow them to stand out and gain credit in the field. Thus, as a result 
of both the decreased attention to the survival point that is enabled by their reference group, 
and the increased attention to the aspiration level associated with this same group, low-status 
actors from a high-status group will be likely to behave in less conventional (or more 
unconventional) ways. 
High-status actors from high-ascribed status groups. Actors in this scenario, as 
depicted in quadrant 2 in Table 1, are unambiguously recognized and categorized as having 
                                                 
2 The survival point has been shown to play a role in decision-making of both organizations taking strategic actions 
to avoid failing (Audia & Greve, 2006) and individuals aiming at maintaining their participation in a domain 
(Boyle & Shapira, 2012). As Moliterno et al. (2014: 2) note, “to establish the standards of group membership, 
continued participation in a particular group is conceptually analogous to ‘survival’ in behavioral theory of the 
firm literature”. Individuals’ attention to the survival point can relate, for example, to efforts to avoid being fired 
(Hong et al., 2000).  
 
14 
 
“high-status” – both achieved and ascribed. As a result, these actors will face little risk of losing 
their achieved status due to unconventional choices. Not only will adverse implications of 
unconventional behavior, in cases when these are not valued or appreciated, be buffered by the 
“idiosyncrasy credits” they have achieved (Hollander, 1958), but the high-status of their 
ascribed category will also provide an additional shield (Ridgeway, 1991; Sharkey, 2014). At 
the same time, as these actors occupy an unambiguously high-status position in the field, their 
audience is also more likely to expect distinctive behavior from them (Hogg, 2010). Therefore, 
we expect that, especially when compared to high-status actors who do not enjoy high-ascribed 
status (which we discuss later below), high-status actors from high-ascribed status groups will 
be more likely to favor risky nonconforming behavior. 
Middle-status actors from high-ascribed status groups. Similar to Phillips and 
Zuckerman (2001), we base our expectation about the conformity-related behavior of middle-
status-actors, as depicted in the “middle” column in Table 1, on the assumptions we make about 
the dispositions of low-status and high-status actors. Middle-status actors are in a grey area (in 
between low- and high-status) where the above-described pressures will be mitigated. 
Specifically, middle-status actors from high-ascribed status groups are less subject to the 
pressures of demonstrating that they deserve their claim to membership to their high-status 
reference group (when compared to low-status actors in this same group). At the same time 
middle-status actors are not yet as secure (as high-status actors in this group are) of their 
standing in the field. 
As low-status actors increase their achieved status, their incentive to be nonconforming 
and bold decreases, because the anxiety that was due to the inconsistency between their 
achieved and ascribed status diminishes. As a result, these (now) middle-status actors would 
feel less deprived of the individual recognition that is expected on the basis of their ascribed 
status. Being less anxious of realigning their individual status to that of their reference group, 
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these actors will become progressively more likely to favor safe conformity over risky 
nonconforming behavior.  
This reduced incentive to display deviance is coupled with the fact that actors in a 
middle-status position – unlike actors with a consolidated position (i.e., actors who are both 
high-achieved status and high-ascribed status) – are not yet buffered from the risk of losing 
their achieved status. As a result, compared to either low-status or high-status actors, middle-
status actors from these groups will consider to a greater degree the risk of losing the status 
they have achieved when they contemplate undertaking nonconforming behavior. Whereas for 
both low-status and high-status actors, nonconforming behavior that is not valued by the 
audience is unlikely to come with genuinely adverse consequences, the same outcome would 
present a greater risk for a middle-status actor.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is an inverted-U-shaped relationship between 
achieved status and conformity among actors from high-ascribed status 
groups. 
 
Status and conformity among members of low-ascribed status groups 
We now turn to cases in which actors do not have high-ascribed status. The path traced 
for these actors is different, as we will detail below. Accordingly, this path generates a different 
relationship between achieved status and conformity than the one we posit in Hypothesis 1.  
Low-status actors from low-ascribed status groups. Actors in this group who have 
low-achieved status, as in quadrant 3 in Table 1, cannot rely on the status of their ascribed 
category to shield them from the penalties of deviant behavior. As a result of being 
unambiguously low-status, these actors might be regarded as permanent outsiders in the field. 
Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) suggest that permanent outsiders will resolve the anxiety that 
such a position brings by searching for an alternative audience for whom they can claim and 
assert their membership. However, “finding neighboring interfaces may often be quite difficult” 
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(Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 389). Even if such an audience were available, low-status actors 
from low-ascribed status groups might suffer from the implications of their low-ascribed status 
characteristic in their interactions with that audience as well. This might happen because 
ascribed status is a form of “diffused status” (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003): it is not necessarily 
tied to a particular context and is possibly applicable to a variety of situations, especially when 
compared to achieved status. As a result, because they might end up as permanent outsiders for 
an alternative audience, just as they are for the focal one, actors who have both low-ascribed 
status and low-achieved status “have little choice but to redouble their efforts to signal 
membership through greater conformity” (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 389).  
Deviant behavior can be penalized not only based on the low individual status of the 
specific actor, but also due to their association to a low-ascribed-status group. As described by 
Thomas-Hunt and Phillips (2011: 255) for the case of low-status racial groups: “possession of 
distinctive racial characteristics may be used to make attributions about the non-normative 
behavior, further heightening the salience of race. When the non-normative behaviors are 
perceived to be extreme, individuals may be labeled as ‘deviants,’ an event which elicits 
negative reactions.” Thus, receiving little support or forbearance, but instead disapproval and 
scrutiny on the basis of their association to a low-ascribed status group, and lacking individual 
recognition in the field due to their low-achieved status, actors that occupy this position will 
be attentive to the survival point and more concerned about preserving their participation in the 
field (Boyle & Shapira, 2012; Moliterno et al., 2014). When facing such a risk, actors are likely 
to become “rigid and unable to generate risky courses of action” (Audia & Greve, 2006: 85–
86), and thus more likely to secure their position by following consensus practices, 
conventional and conforming behavior, in the field (cf. Hong et al., 2000).  
In conclusion, as different from low-achieved-status actors from high-ascribed-status 
groups (who are more likely to deviate), low-achieved-status actors from low-ascribed-status 
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groups are more likely to conform. The precarious status of these unambiguously low-status 
actors in the field directs their attention toward survival-point related concerns about 
continuing their participation (rather than higher aspirations), which channels them to less risky, 
conformist behavior. 
High-status actors from low-ascribed status groups. The situation is different in 
quadrant 4, where actors from low-ascribed status groups have achieved high individual status. 
This position yields an inconsistency between the high status they have individually achieved 
and the low ascribed status that they have inherited. Status inconsistency generates anxiety 
(Stryker & Macke, 1978). However, the anxiety in this case would be different from the one 
we have described in the case of actors with low-achieved status and high-ascribed status, 
where the anxiety was rooted in not getting what one deserves, or what is expected based on 
one’s group membership. In the present case, the anxiety is of a different kind, because the 
dimension that is lagging is the one that cannot be changed, rather than the more malleable one. 
As a result, the anxiety in this quadrant corresponds to having achieved what might not have 
been expected, due to actors and audiences being more likely to anchor their evaluation to the 
low expectations linked to these actors’ low ascribed status. Actors from low-status ascribed 
categories are more likely to underestimate their abilities (Beyer, 1990) and attribute their 
success to others rather than to their own superior competence (Haynes & Heilman, 2013). 
Instead of using self-serving attributions and taking credit for their success, these actors are 
more likely to be cautious in their self-presentation and conform to what is accepted as standard 
in the field to fend off worrying future re-evaluation (cf. Zuckerman, 1979). This tendency to 
conform might also be reinforced by the assessment of audiences. Audiences might be more 
likely to question and scrutinize the achievements of actors from low-status groups (Cowman 
& Ferrari, 2002; Ridgeway, Johnson, & Diekema, 1994), since these achievements are 
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inconsistent with audience expectations based on the actors’ group (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003; 
Foschi, 2000; Thomas-Hunt & Phillips, 2011).  
Not having the confidence that might be granted by membership in a high-status group 
and facing greater scrutiny for their achieved status, high-status actors from low-ascribed status 
groups might be more likely to wish “fly under the radar” and conform to the status quo, 
seeking to minimize the risk of a revaluation of their status.   
Middle-status actors from low-ascribed status groups. Similar to the case for their 
peers from high-ascribed-status groups, middle-status actors in these groups will also find 
themselves in a gray area where the pressures that low-status and high-status actors face are 
mitigated. However, in contrast to their peers from high-ascribed status groups, middle-status 
actors from low-ascribed status groups have relative freedom from pressures to conform, rather 
than from pressures to deviate. Specifically, middle-status actors from low-ascribed status 
groups will be less subject to the conformity pressure that low-status actors from the same 
group are subject to. This is because, having managed to achieve some individual status in the 
field, they will have moved up and away from the survival point and the associated concerns 
about being permanently excluded faced by low-status actors. On the other hand, when 
compared to actors from this same low-ascribed status group who have achieved high status, 
middle-status actors do not occupy a position that draws greater scrutiny on account of its 
unusual standing.  
 To sum up, whereas we expect middle-status-conformity among actors who have high-
ascribed status, as we have formalized in H1, for actors with low ascribed status, we expect a 
different relationship between status and conformity. Specifically, we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a U-shaped relationship between achieved status 
and conformity among actors from low-ascribed status groups. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
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We test our hypotheses using data on the 27 largest symphony orchestras (by operating 
budget) in the United States from 1918 to 1969. In our period, these orchestras represent the 
set of organizations operating in the same league, and their conductors also compete for status 
in the same hierarchy (Durand & Kremp, 2016). A number of properties make this a suitable 
setting to test our hypotheses.  
First, during this period, the music programming (repertoire) decisions were 
consolidated in the principle conductor (also known as music director during our study period), 
who was in charge of selecting which compositions to play in a given season. Thus, as similar 
to the case for CEOs in many industries (e.g., Graffin, Wade, Porac, & McNamee, 2008), the 
individual characteristics of the leading organizational figures in our setting can play a pivotal 
role in determining the decision to conform to or deviate from conventional practices in the 
field.   
Second, conventional practices are institutionalized in the field and can be tracked over 
time in classical music. Orchestral classical music has been infused with tradition and rules, 
which indicate the composers that represent the canon that concert-goers expect to see 
performed. The musical canon, as embodying an exaltation of particular compositions and 
composers, originated in the 1800s in Europe and diffused to the United States via traveling 
musicians (Dowd, Liddle, Lupo, & Borden, 2002). It is epitomized in the composers “that were 
revered for their greatness and were performed on a continual basis” (Weber, 1992: 21) and 
thus, as the American Musicology Society defined it in 1987, is what is known as “standard 
repertoire” (Citron, 1990: 102).  
Due to the venerated, almost “sacred,” standing of certain composers in classical music 
(DiMaggio, 1982), playing the canon corresponds to compliance with a normative prescription 
and is therefore a safe option for a conductor to gain legitimacy in the field. However, as in 
many other social contexts where deviating from conventional practices presents a means to 
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stand out and be distinctive, conductors who deviate from the canon and play less-performed 
composers might gain recognition if this unconventional choice end up being well-received 
(Durand & Kremp, 2016). Naturally, this latter option comes with higher risk. If the bold 
repertoire choice ends up not being appreciated, the status of the conductor might be 
undermined. As Pompe and his colleagues (2011: 168) note: “Historically, new compositions 
have often been poorly accepted initially. For example, at the 1913 premier in Paris of 
Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring, the audience erupted into a yelling and fighting mob during the 
performance. Today, the Rite of Spring is considered to be one of the most important 
compositions in the entire repertoire and performed regularly by major SOs”. Similarly, in 
1923 the Hungarian conductor and composer Ernst von Dohnányi premiered Bartók’s Dance 
Suite, which “suffered a shocking failure, as Dohnányi could not find his way in the music and 
so of course the players could not find theirs either” (Lebrecht, 1991: 9).  
In brief, conforming to the canon satisfies the condition by which the “pressure for 
conformity pertains to an action that the audience generally uses to ascertain who is a player. 
That is, a scope condition pertaining to the action in question is that there must be a significant 
threat that the benefits of undertaking it will be outweighed by its capacity to signal that the 
actor is illegitimate. At the same time, it must not be the case that the action is so discrediting 
that it will tarnish even a secure, high-status player” (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 390, italics 
in the original text). As a result, whereas actors who are unequivocally celebrated in the field 
(in our framework, those who are in the high-achieved-status and high-ascribed-status quadrant) 
will not realistically have their standing questioned even for an unsuccessful experimentation 
with less conventional repertoire, actors who do not enjoy such consolidated status will have 
to balance the risk (costs) of performing bolder repertoire with the returns that this distinctive 
choice might bring. 
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Third, this setting allows us to study the two forms of status we are concerned with: the 
individual’s achieved status, as symbolized by the recognition that the conductor has received 
in the field—operationalized by the recordings of the conductor, and the individual’s group 
ascribed status, bestowed upon the conductor based on the prominence of his national 
affiliation within the musical tradition. In this context, two countries, namely Germany and 
Austria, are regarded as unequivocally high-status, due to the stature of composers from those 
countries such as Bach, Mozart, Brahms, Beethoven, and a long list of others.  
Data and Sample 
We collected the repertoire of compositions played by the 27 symphony orchestras from 
1918, the first year in which more than one conductor in our sample produced recordings, to 
1969, through a dataset originally assembled by Mueller (1973), which we retrieved from the 
Cultural Policy and the Arts National Data Archive (CPANDA). This database was compiled 
over a period of almost 40 years by John Henry Mueller and Kate Hevner Mueller (Mueller, 
1973). We further checked and updated this dataset by incorporating the recently digitized 
version of repertoire information from New York Philharmonic. Following Dowd and 
colleagues (2002), we exclude season repertoires that have fewer than 10 performances (i.e., 
compositions played). There are 17 such cases in our sample, that is 1.6% of the total season 
repertoires (which can also be referred to as conductor-year observations) in our sample. 
Compared with an average of about 71 performances in a season, these are irregular seasons 
that pertain to formation years of symphony orchestras and are not comparable to regular 
seasons. However, our results are robust if we include these 17 cases.  
In addition to the repertoire of compositions played by these orchestras, the dataset also 
includes information on the nationality of composers. We complement this information with 
hand-collected data on the conductors. First, we collected biographical information for all 100 
principle conductors of these 27 major U.S. symphony orchestras in the period 1918–1969. 
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This included life and career histories from publicly available sources, such as encyclopedias, 
books, and symphony orchestra websites, as well as more specialized sources, such as the 
website Ancestry.com.  
In addition, to assess the status of conductors we collected information on orchestral 
classical music recordings from A Classical Discography (classical-discography.org, data 
retrieved in July 2018). A Classical Discography is a well-known specialized database among 
collectors of classical music recordings. It is compiled by Michael Gray, Music Librarian for 
the Voice of America in Washington, D.C. This dataset has been compiled over decades “of 
research in the archives of recording companies in the United States and in Western and Central 
Europe” (Gray, 2018). It contains 182,353 matrices (master recordings) of orchestral music 
where a conductor was identified (the database also includes classical non-orchestral music 
that we do not consider in our analysis). For each such matrix (master recording) the database 
includes information about the date in which the recording took place, the conductor, the 
orchestra, and the label that made the recording. Using these data, we identified all of the 
recordings of performances that were conducted by any of the 100 conductors in our sample. 
This process yielded 11,335 matrices (master recordings, which are the original recordings of 
a performance from which any later copies are made) for the conductors in our estimation data, 
from the beginning of the recording era until 1969.  
Dependent variable 
Conductor conformity. To assess the degree to which conductors show conformity to 
what is established in the field, we develop a measure that captures the extent to which the 
repertoire played by a conductor i at time t leans toward canonical composers, versus more 
unconventional composers. To this end, we first identify the canonical (unconventional) 
composers at time t as those composers who have been more (less) widely played in the field 
in the previous five years (t-1 to t-5). Specifically, we measure the proportion of compositions 
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written by each composer c that was performed by other conductors (-i) in the previous 5 years 
in the field. We also run sensitivity tests computing the proportion in the previous 3 and 7 years. 
Results with either the shorter or the longer window provide very similar levels of statistical 
support to our hypotheses as the ones reported below using the 5-year window. More formally, 
we compute: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚.𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐,−𝑖,(𝑡−1,𝑡−5)
𝑁𝑢𝑚.𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠−𝑖,(𝑡−1,𝑡−5)
  (1) 
We then scaled this composer conventionality score, calculated as above, by the most played 
composer, so that the most played composer gets a value of 1. For example, if other conductors 
in the field played 100 compositions, 95 of which are by Beethoven and 5 of which are by 
Moszkowski, Beethoven would be regarded as the epitome of the canon and get a 
conventionality score of 1, whereas Moszkowski would be weakly representative of the canon 
(i.e., an unconventional composer) and, accordingly, get a score of about 0.05, calculated as 
(5/100)/(95/100). As a result, conductors who include Beethoven’s compositions in their 
repertoire are conforming to the canon more, whereas those who include Moszkowski conform 
to the canon less (or deviate from it). Specifically, a focal conductor’s conformity will depend 
on the relative prominence of conventional composers (e.g., Beethoven) over unconventional 
ones (e.g., Moszkowski) in the conductor’s repertoire in a given year.  
Thus, conductor conformity is the weighted average of the conventionality of 
composers’ in the repertoire, where the weight is calculated as the number of compositions by 
a composer (𝑛𝑐,𝑖,𝑡)  that are included in the repertoire, divided by the total number of all 
compositions played by the conductor (𝑁𝑖). More formally: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑖,𝑡×𝑐 𝑛𝑐,𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑖
  (2) 
To illustrate, if a conductor played 3 compositions by Beethoven and 1 by Moszkowski, he 
will be conforming to the canon more, 0.7625 = (1 × 3 + 0.05 × 1)/4, than if he played 3 
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compositions by Moszkowski and 1 by Beethoven, 0.2875 = (1 × 1 + 0.05 × 3)/4. Thus, our 
conductor conformity variable can range between 0 and 1, where a value of 0 indicates a 
repertoire that includes solely those composers who are not played by any other conductors in 
the field, and a value of 1 indicates a repertoire that is based only on the most representative 
composer(s) in the canon (i.e., Beethoven in the example above).  
Independent variables 
Ascribed status. We consider ascribed status as the status that is ascribed to someone 
as a result of their membership in a particular category. In our case, this category is the 
conductor’s country of origin. Country of origin represents one of the most salient categories 
in our setting, as it is well known that certain countries enjoy superior status in classical music. 
For example, when talking about the pantheon of classical music, Theodore Thomas, the 
conductor of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra between 1891 and 1905, noted: “Bach, Handel, 
Mozart and Beethoven are the sons of God!” (Levine, 1988: 118). The Germanic (Austro-
German) repertoire from Bach to Mozart to Richard Strauss to Schoenberg, became 
synonymous with uncompromising adherence to high standards, and achieved an almost sacred 
status in the concert hall (Bowen, 2003). 
Status of a given country is bequeathed to conductors originating from that country, 
thus constituting their ascribed status. As Mueller (1973: xii) explains “the Central European 
tradition which gave these [U.S.] orchestras many, indeed most, of their early conductors 
would in itself account for the dominance of the Austro-German music in the early repertoires; 
it always comprised more than half of the music presented. This dominance continues however 
through the later decades when conductors from many other cultures were on the podiums, and 
when audiences were very much aware of the richness and variety of musical resources from 
many other European and Far Eastern countries”. Austro-German conductors’ authority in the 
field of classical music was recognized by audiences and peers alike. In his book The Virtuoso 
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Conductors, Raymond Holden (2005: 1), for example, writes about the Austro-German 
conductors that “their unique relationship with the music that they performed set them apart 
from the other schools of conducting that emerged during the same period.” Additionally, he 
writes that the “British and American audiences were impressed by Austro-German musicians 
and considered that their interpretations of works from the Central European repertoire had 
greater authority than those of conductors from other ethnic backgrounds” (Holden, 2005: 200). 
Thus, even though some conductors of U.S. orchestras who come from other nationalities have 
certainly achieved high individual status over time (both in the past and today), those coming 
from Germany-Austria have enjoyed superior ascribed status. 
To measure the ascribed status of the conductor, we use an indicator variable that is 
coded 1 for conductors who have high-ascribed-status (conductors from Germany or Austria), 
and 0 otherwise.  
 Achieved status. We measure conductors’ achieved status on the basis of the number of 
recordings they made. The birth of recorded sound toward the end of the 19th century produced 
a musical revolution in the beginning of the 20th century, marking a shift in classical music. 
The importance of the recording industry has been well noted and discussed in the literature 
(DiMaggio, 1991, 1992; Dowd et al., 2002). First, it gave access to classical music to a 
widespread audience, which was no longer confined to the vicinity of the orchestra’s location: 
“as phonographic technologies provided a means… [for] people to experience music not by 
attending unique live performances or by producing music themselves in their homes but 
instead by purchasing recordings” (Thompson, 1995: 132). As an advertisement in 1904 put it: 
“In your own home, miles and miles away from London…you can be seated comfortably round 
your fire listening to the Best Songs, the Best Bands, and the best of the World’s Musical Talent” 
(Doggett, 2015: 16). Owing to such widespread distribution, some singers, instrumentalists, 
and conductors became worldwide stars whose status transcended time and space. Because of 
26 
 
these attributes, the recording industry won over even initial skeptics like Toscanini, who 
“came to regard it [recording] as a means of affirming his superiority by achieving clearer 
sound and bigger sales than other conductors” (Lebrecht, 1991: 72). Recording deals became 
coveted and conductors vied for such recognition and rarely turned down a chance. In the case 
of orchestral classical music, especially, it should be noted that being allowed and invited to 
record is an important act of deference, particularly when such an invitation comes from the 
more prominent labels in the field. Status is expressed by (or formed through) acts of deference 
from high-status parties (Podolny, 1993; Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 2012).  
Accordingly, we assessed the achieved status of a conductor at time t as the cumulative 
number of recordings, from the beginning of his career up to the current year, where we 
assigned greater (lower) weight to recordings the conductor made under more (less) prominent 
labels. We computed the prominence of a label as the proportion of recordings made under that 
label in a given year (at time t) over the total number of all recordings made under all labels in 
that year. Thus, we consider that a composition that is recorded with a prominent, major label 
such as Victor will give a greater boost to the status of the conductor, whereas a composition 
recorded with a less-known label like Syrena Record will add less to the status of the conductor. 
To reflect the idea that status reflects one’s relative position in a social hierarchy (Podolny, 
1993; Gould, 2002) and to facilitate the comparability of conductors across different eras in 
terms of recording conventions (due to different tastes/trends, technology, and finances), we 
construct such a relative standing by calculating the percentile ranking position that a given 
conductor occupies in the status hierarchy in a given year. This is obtained by ordering 
conductors based on the overall number of recordings as described before (so that conductors 
with a greater number of cumulative recording with prominent labels get a higher ranking) and 
scaling the obtained ranking position by the total number of active conductors that year. For 
example, if the focal conductor has the highest score on the basis of cumulative recordings, 
27 
 
and there are 10 conductors competing for status in the field that year, the focal conductor gets 
a percentile ranking of 1 (indicating that no other conductor in the field has a higher status than 
the focal conductor). If he has the second highest score of recordings that year, his percentile 
ranking will be 0.9 (indicating that 10%, i.e., 1 out of the 10 in the field has a greater status 
than the focal conductor), and so on. If the field is more populated and encompasses for 
example 20 conductors, the first and second conductor get percentile ranking scores of 1 and 
0.95 respectively, signifying that to be ranked as second in a more competitive field is a greater 
achievement. If more than one conductor has the same recording score, we assign such 
conductors the midpoint value of the ranks they take up (cf. Hong et al., 2000).  
Control variables 
We control for several conductor and orchestra attributes that might relate to both the 
level of conformity displayed by a conductor and his achieved status.  
We start with a description of the orchestra characteristics that we control for. First, we 
controlled for the orchestra’s Repertoire size in a given year: the number of compositions that 
an orchestra has performed in the current year. We control for this variable to ensure that 
conformity or deviance is not simply an artifact of the number of compositions played. 
Repertoire size might also be regarded as a control of the orchestra size, since bigger orchestras 
can afford to schedule performance more often during their concert seasons (Durand & Kremp, 
2016). As a further indicator of orchestra size, we also used an indicator variable capturing 
whether the conductor is directing any one of the orchestras that are conventionally known as 
the Big five orchestras, which are the New York Symphony Orchestra and the Philharmonic 
Symphony of New York (which were merged in 1928 to form the New York Philharmonic), 
the Boston Symphony Orchestra, the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, the Cleveland Orchestra, 
and the Philadelphia Orchestra. This indicator variable is coded 1 if in the current year the 
conductor was employed at one of these “Big Five” orchestras, and 0 otherwise. The term “Big 
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Five” comes from the fact that these were the first orchestras in the U.S. that had the resources 
to offer concert seasons without interruption, thereby establishing them as full-time orchestras 
and not “music societies” (Mueller, 1973). Third, to tease out other potential confounding 
effects due to the fact that the conductor might work for an organization that is a trend-setter, 
with the reputation to adopt successful innovative choices in the field, we followed Durand and 
Kremp (2016) and controlled for Orchestra centrality, and also its quadratic form to account 
for a possible curvilinear effect (also as in Durand & Kremp, 2016) in a network constructed 
from a diffusion pattern of new composers.  
We also controlled for several conductor-level characteristics. First, we controlled for 
Conducting experience in the U.S.: the number of years since a conductor made his debut as a 
conductor in one of the 27 symphony orchestras in our sample. Second, we controlled for 
Conductor tenure at the orchestra: the number of years that a conductor has been in that role 
in the current orchestra. Third, because the status of being a newcomer can influence the extent 
to which a conductor might feel pressured to conform (March, 1991), we controlled for whether 
the current year was the first year of a conductor’s tenure at his current orchestra, labeled First 
year with the orchestra. Fourth, because it might be possible that achieved status itself is related 
to moving between orchestras, we controlled for the number of prior orchestras in our sample 
that a conductor had served in as a conductor, labeled Num. of prior orchestras. Fifth, we 
controlled for Conational composer popularity: the extent to which composers who are of the 
same nationality as the conductor are popular in the field, by measuring the proportion of all 
compositions played by all orchestras in the previous five years that were written by composers 
of the same nationality as the conductor. This control is important to ensure that the effect of 
our ascribed status measure is indeed an unmalleable status trait and not confounded by a trend 
in the field whereby a certain nation becomes more popular in a given period. Sixth, to account 
for the tendency by which conductors might favor composers of their own nationality, we also 
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controlled for how much a conductor performed compositions written by conational composers. 
We measure this Preference toward conational composers as the number of compositions that 
are written by composers from the same nationality as the conductor that the conductor 
performed in the previous five years. Seventh, we controlled for decade fixed effects to account 
for period specific trends in the level of conformity. In order to keep the decimal points 
consistent, we divided Repertoire size, Orchestra centrality, Conducting experience in the U.S., 
Conductor tenure at the Orchestra, and Preference toward conational composers by 100.  
Finally, we accounted for time-invariant heterogeneity across conductors (for example, 
the intrinsic talent of the conductor, his personality traits, experience prior to joining an 
orchestra in the U.S. such as educational background before becoming a conductor, and 
behavioral tendencies that might be associated to the country of origin such as those stemming 
from the country’s culture) by including conductor fixed effects. Because of the inclusion of 
conductor fixed effects, the main effect of ascribed status (being the country of origin and not 
varying over time for a given individual) is absorbed and will not be estimated in our OLS 
regressions. In the robustness section however, we also used the hybrid model (Allison, 2009), 
which allows us to estimate both the between effects and the within effects from the fixed 
effects regression specification, thus providing estimates also for the main effect of ascribed 
status.  
Analysis 
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) models with a pooled panel design to estimate 
the level of conformity that a conductor displays in his choice of the repertoire for a given year. 
Formally, we estimated the following model, which includes conductor fixed effects (𝛼𝑖) and 
decade fixed effects (𝛿𝑡). 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1(𝐴𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐴𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠) 
                        +𝛽2(𝐴𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐴𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠) 
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                      +𝛽3(𝐴𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝐴𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑) 
                                         + 𝑿𝒊,𝒕𝜸 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                 (3) 
 
 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 are the coefficients that are used to test the U-shaped relationship between Achieved 
status and conformity for the group of conductors who have low-ascribed-status characteristics, 
that is for the cases in which the High Ascribed Status dummy variable is equal to zero. As we 
hypothesized in H2, we expect a U-shaped relationship between achieved status and 
conformity for this group, that is we expect 𝛽3 to be negative and 𝛽4 to be positive.  
In H1, we hypothesized instead that for the group of conductors with High Ascribed 
Status (i.e., when that dummy variable is equal to one), the relationship between Achieved 
status and Conductor conformity is inverted U-shaped. To test this functional form, we have to 
consider all four coefficients: 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 𝛽4. First, we expect 𝛽1 to be positive and 𝛽2 to 
be negative. But to ensure that the relationship is indeed curvilinear and that having high-
ascribed status does not simply flatten the U-shaped relationship estimated in 𝛽3 and 𝛽4, but 
rather indeed reverses the curvilinear form, the estimated coefficients should also satisfy the 
following condition: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 < 0 (is negative) and 𝛽2 + 𝛽4 > 0 (is positive). 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 is the vector of 
time-varying controls and 𝜸  is the vector of their coefficients. To account for possible 
heteroscedasticity in the error terms, for example due to variables that are not distributed 
normally, we used robust standard errors. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics and the correlations between the covariates. 
We note that conductors’ tenure at an orchestra is on average about seven years. The most 
mobile conductors (Artur Rodzinski and Leopold Stokowski) have directed four orchestras in 
our sample, but most conductors (78 out of 100 conductors) directed just one orchestra during 
our study period. 15 of the 100 conductors in our sample have high ascribed status.  
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--- Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here --- 
Table 3 shows the results from our estimation models. Model 1 is the baseline model 
with the control variables. In Models 2 through 4 we introduce each of our variables of interest 
in a stepwise approach before testing our hypotheses using the full specification in Model 5. In 
Model 2, we add the simple effect of Achieved status. In Model 3, we add Achieved status 
squared. Then, we add the interaction between the simple effect of Achieved status and the 
High Ascribed status dummy in Model 4. Finally, we add the interaction between Achieved 
status squared and the High Ascribed status dummy in Model 5. Model 5 is the fully specified 
model that corresponds to equation (3), which is accordingly the model that we use to test our 
hypotheses. To see if multicollinearity might cause problems for our inference, we check 
whether the VIF and condition number in Model 5 are within conventionally accepted levels. 
The maximum VIF is 6.18 and the average VIF is 2.41, and the condition number of the model 
is 6.61. These figures are within accepted levels. 
As discussed above, our hypothesis for the group of conductors with high ascribed- 
status (H1) would be confirmed if (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) > 0, and (𝛽2 + 𝛽4) < 0, and our hypothesis for the 
low-ascribed-status group (H2) would be confirmed if 𝛽3 < 0 and 𝛽4 > 0. The coefficients 
associated with Achieved status (𝛽3) and Achieved status squared (𝛽4) reported in Model 5 
provide support for H2: 𝛽3  is negative and significant (p < .05) and 𝛽4  is positive and 
significant (p < .01).  
Consistent with H1 the coefficient of Achieved status × High Ascribed status (𝛽1) is 
positive and the coefficient of Achieved status squared × High Ascribed status (𝛽2) is negative. 
As we have mentioned, however, to test whether these coefficients reverse the U-shaped 
relationship estimated with the 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 coefficients, we also need to check whether 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 
is significantly positive and 𝛽2 + 𝛽4 is significantly negative. To do this, we use the non-linear 
combination (nlcom) method in STATA 14, which calculates the joint standard error needed 
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to test the statistical significance of the joint effect of two coefficients (Phillips & Park, 1988). 
A Wald test of the joint effect indicates that 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 is positive and statistically significant (p 
< .01) and 𝛽2 + 𝛽4 is negative and statistically significant (p < .01), thereby supporting H1. In 
Figure 1, we graphically represent the two estimated curvilinear forms (and the scatterplot) for 
the relationship between achieved status and conformity for high-ascribed status and low-
ascribed status, respectively. In the top panel, we also include the histograms of Achieved status 
for each ascribed status group.  
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
The figure shows that Achieved status within each Ascribed status group is well-
distributed across different ranges. The inverted U-shaped relationship for high-ascribed-status 
conductors appears to be more pronounced than the U-shaped relationship for low-ascribed-
status ones. 
Robustness Checks 
We perform a set of robustness tests to check (1) the significance of the curvilinear 
form estimated in our main model (Haans, Pieters, & He, 2016), and (2) the robustness of our 
results with a regression approach (the hybrid method) that allows us to also estimate the main 
effect of ascribed status while including conductor fixed effects (Allison, 2009).  
To provide further tests of the significance of the curvilinear relationships, we follow 
Haans, Pieters, & He (2016), who propose that in addition to the significance of the coefficients 
of the relevant (first-order and quadratic) terms, two additional tests should be performed, 
assessing: (1) the presence of significant slopes at the minimum and maximum levels of the 
independent variable, (2) the presence of an inflection point that is inside the observed range 
of the independent variable.  
 Table 4 shows the result of these two tests. The first test reported in Panel A shows 
that the slopes at the minimum and at the maximum values are significant and in the predicted 
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direction, both for conductors who have High Ascribed status (German/Austrian conductors) 
and conductors with Low Ascribed status (non-German/non-Austrian conductors). The second 
test (reported in Panel B) shows that the inflection point and its 95 percent confidence interval 
are inside the range of Achieved status in our estimation sample, providing further support for 
the inverted U-shaped relationship for conductors who have High Ascribed status (as predicted 
in H1) and the U-shaped relationship that we predict for conductors with Low Ascribed status 
(as predicted in H2).  
--- Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here --- 
When testing a moderation of curvilinear forms, whereby the curvilinear form is 
expected to change in the different conditions (or sub-samples), Haans and his colleagues (2016) 
also proposed to test the two curvilinear forms in a split sample. We provide this test by 
splitting the sample based on to the dummy moderating variable Ascribed status. Table 5 shows 
the results from this analysis. The results reported in Model 6 are for the subsample that consists 
of only conductors with High Ascribed status (German/Austrian). The positive effect of 
Achieved status (p < .05) and the negative effect of Achieved status squared (p = .071) provide 
further robust results for the inverted U-shaped relationship hypothesized in H1. The results 
reported in Model 7 are from a subsample that includes only conductors with Low Ascribed 
status (non-German/non-Austrian). The negative effect of Achieved status (p < .05) and the 
positive effect of Achieved status squared (p < .01) supports the U-shaped relationship 
hypothesized in H2.  
We test the robustness of our results also with the hybrid (between-within) model 
proposed by Allison (2009; see Certo, Withers, & Semadeni, 2017 for a recent use of these 
models in management). In following this approach, we demean the predictor variables and 
add the mean of these variables as a separate set of predictors. The demeaned predictor 
variables will estimate the within estimator of the fixed effects OLS model and the means of 
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these variables will estimate the between estimator of the fixed effects OLS model (Greene, 
2003). For robust inference, the hybrid model is estimated with conductor random effects 
(Schunck, 2013). Table 6 shows the results from the hybrid method. Consistent with our results 
in our main analysis, as reported in Model 5 of Table 3, we find that the coefficient associated 
to Achieved status for Low ascribed status conductors (𝛽3) is negative and significant (p < .05) 
and the coefficient associated to the squared term of Achieved status (𝛽4) is positive and 
significant (p < .01), thereby supporting H2. In addition, 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 is positive and statistically 
significant (p < .01) and 𝛽2 + 𝛽4 is negative and statistically significant (p < .01), thereby 
supporting H1. Model 9 and Model 10 are the estimates from the split sample between High 
ascribed status and Low ascribed status using the hybrid model. The results are consistent: the 
coefficients show an inverted U-shaped relationship with High ascribed status and U-shaped 
relationships with Low ascribed status.    
--- Insert Table 6 about here --- 
DISCUSSION 
Decisions about conforming to or deviating from conventional practices is an important 
topic in research on sociology, organizations, and management (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; 
Thornton, 2002; Askin & Mauskapf, 2017; Zhao et al., 2018). The position that decision 
makers occupy in the status hierarchy is a crucial factor affecting these decisions (Durand & 
Kremp, 2016; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). To resolve the debate about different relational 
forms between status and conformity that have been proposed in the literature, Phillips and 
Zuckerman (2001) turned the focus to specific structural conditions, which end up making low-
status and high-status actors less constrained and therefore freer to deviate. Accordingly, under 
specific structural scope conditions, Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) argued, the relationship 
between status and conformity is inverted U-shaped. Yet, subsequent research has largely 
overlooked these structural scope conditions and considered middle-status conformity as a 
generally expected, default, relationship. 
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We challenge this status quo by departing from Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) in 
several important aspects. We do this by acknowledging the possibility that actors can have 
different status positions in different hierarchies and that their position in a more stable 
hierarchy can have implications for their sense of security or exclusion based on their position 
in the other, less stable, hierarchy. By exploring the effect of one status dimension on the 
implications of the other, we argue that the relationship between status and conformity depends 
on the specific conditions that make high-status and low-status actors either more prone to 
deviate or more likely to conform. In doing so, we relax the numerous assumptions needed to 
justify the middle-status-conformity theory and build our theory instead on the interplay 
between two of the most studied forms of status in the literature: ascribed and achieved status. 
For actors from high-ascribed-status groups, we hypothesize and find that the relationship 
between achieved status and conformity is inverted U-shaped (H1). For actors from low-
ascribed-status groups, we find the relationship between achieved status and conformity to be 
U-shaped, as hypothesized (H2). 
The main contribution of our study is to revisit the fundamental underpinnings that 
shape the propensity of actors to adopt conforming behavior. By studying the interplay between 
the positions that actors occupy in different status hierarchies, we redefine the scope conditions 
under which middle-status-conformity arises, and uncover novel conditions by which the 
opposite, middle-status deviance, unfolds. Thus, our theory and results reorient the literature 
on status and conformity by suggesting a parsimonious condition that leads to different 
relationships between status and conformity. Even though our results contribute primarily to 
the study of how actors position themselves in the conformity-distinctiveness spectrum based 
on their status, they also offer insights to the literature on how such a positioning affects the 
audiences that evaluate these actors. A burgeoning literature has been focusing on uncovering 
the level of optimal distinctiveness that maximizes the audience’s evaluation of actors (Askin 
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& Mauskapf, 2017; Zhao et al., 2018). Our results point indicate that the study of the level of 
optimal distinctiveness should not be disjointed from a consideration of the attributes of the 
actors that produce it, and specifically that this level might vary depending on the ascribed and 
achieved status of actors. 
Our work can also inform research in other areas as well, such as the one that relates 
CEO’s characteristics to firm behavior. The status of the CEO is recognized as a relevant 
characteristic in this literature. A stream of research has focused on the status that the CEO has 
achieved, often to explain CEO and Top Management Teams’ compensation (Graffin et al., 
2008; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006). A separate stream of research has investigated 
the role of CEO’s ascribed status characteristics, showing, for example, that the CEO’s gender 
and race affect investors’ reaction to news (Lee & James, 2007), career opportunities and 
compensation (Cook & Glass, 2014; Hill, Upadhyay, & Beekun, 2015), and employee 
motivation within the firm (McDonald, Keeves, & Westphal, 2017). Our framework offers a 
way to bridge these two streams of research on CEOs’ status by considering how their diffuse 
characteristics (such as gender, race and, as we emphasize in our study, country of origin) and 
individual status together, in their interplay, affect their strategic decisions, for example 
decision about differentiating their product offerings with respect to those of their competitors. 
Our study also adds to the stream of research based on the reinvigorated interest in the 
status literature to consider the possible implications of multiple status hierarchies in which an 
actor, whether this actor is an individual or an organization, can be ranked (Jensen & Wang, 
2018; Kovács & Liu, 2016). Our contribution to this stream is in emphasizing the importance 
of an attribute that distinguishes status hierarchies: their malleability. This difference in the 
malleability in the status hierarchies in which an actor is ranked becomes particularly important 
when assessing the effects of status inconsistency. Research in sociology has suggested 
(Jackson, 1962; Stryker & Macke, 1978) that status inconsistency creates anxiety for actors. 
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By leveraging the difference in malleability between different types of status, we identify 
different types of anxiety for status-inconsistent actors and suggest that these different types of 
anxiety yield different behaviors. When the inconsistency is such that actors can realign their 
low-status position in the more malleable status ranking, to the high-status they enjoy in the 
less malleable ranking, these actors would be subject to the anxiety to increase the status that 
is lagging, to achieve status consistency. Such anxiety is likely to translate to deviant behavior, 
which has a chance of making these actors stand out and potentially enhance their status. When 
the inconsistency is such that the actor suffers instead from a low-status position in a ranking 
that is less malleable, while having a high-status position in the more malleable ranking, the 
actor’s anxiety would be about not undermining the more malleable status position, and thus 
“preserving” the inconsistency. Such anxiety is likely to translate to low-risk conformist 
behavior. The actor’s position in the less malleable ranking functions as an anchoring device 
for the choice to conform or deviate. 
Limitations and Future research 
It is important to note the scope conditions of our theory. Our theory applies only to 
contexts where participants show variation on some salient status characteristics. For example, 
if in our context all conductors were German/Austrian, then conductors from these countries 
could not claim membership to a “distinctive” group. Moreover, our framework, and the 
context we test it in, is characterized by a clear discontinuity between two groups: the high-
status and low-status ones. Many social contexts have been considered in such a dichotomous 
fashion (e.g., male/female, white/ non-white, majority/minority, etc.). Actors who are in the 
low-status category in these settings are generally discriminated on the basis of their inherited 
characteristic. However, in some contexts, the spectrum of ascribed status might be more 
variegated. Our theory does not address cases that present that kind of nuance in the levels of 
ascribed status, such as the one that can emerge, for example, in contexts with actors who 
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introduce a third category. If these actors are categorized by their audience differently in their 
status, one can imagine that ascribed status can be divided into three, or more, categories. The 
interplay of achieved status and ascribed status in these multi-faceted contexts remains an open 
question for future research.  
In addition, we conceptualize and operationalize ascribed status as a fixed characteristic 
of the actor. There are circumstances in which changes in nominal status characteristics may 
reposition the actor in the ascribed status hierarchy. But, even if in some instances actors can 
change – at least on the surface – their inherited nominal characteristics, there are reasons to 
believe that the original characteristics that actors inherit at birth are likely to leave a 
fundamental imprinting on how they are assessed by others. Bourdieu (1984) has argued, for 
example, that even if actors can change their social class during the course of their life, the one 
that they inherit at birth is written into their habitus, i.e., in their ways of being. Similarly, even 
if individuals can change their nationality, the one that they inherit at birth is likely to leave an 
important enough status marker on them. At the extreme, individuals might even be affected 
by the nationality or race (or some other geography-based association) of their relatives or 
progenitors, as can be observed by the fact that some U.S. citizens are labeled by audiences as 
“Italian”-American, “African”-American or “Hispanic/Latino”-American even if their Italian, 
African, or Hispanic origins might be several generations behind. How such changes, whether 
as degradation or elevation, in ascribed status affects conformity remains to be studied. 
Similarly, how unexpected or sudden status losses or gains in one dimension, due to scandals 
or institutional changes (Graffin et al., 2013; Neeley & Dumas, 2016) are filtered by other 
status lenses can be an area of further study. 
Another potential limitation of our study is that we focus on individual actors. However, 
we do not believe that the implications of our theory are confined solely to individuals. The 
particular ascribed-status marker we study, country of origin, characterizes many organizations 
39 
 
as well, as recent work in producers’ authenticity suggests (e.g., Lehman, Kovács, & Carroll, 
2014). Firms and their products are ascribed superior status on the basis of their geographical 
origin, independently of the organizational status they achieve through their accomplishments. 
Similar to the case for individuals that we discussed above, companies will not lose their 
perceived links to their country of origin either, even if they change their incorporation into 
other countries. For example, even if Burger King moves its headquarters to Canada, it is still 
likely to be perceived and evaluated as authentically American by its audience. Likewise, 
companies like Gucci can be incorporated in the U.S. but would still be perceived and evaluated 
as Italian, generally speaking. Therefore, an (in-)consistency between the “inherited” 
geographical attribute and the achievement of the specific organization can lead to similar 
conclusions in the way these firms embrace conformist or deviant behavior. Our theory points 
to the implications of differences in the malleability across multiple status hierarchies in which 
an actor is ranked. More research is needed to better understand how the interaction between 
the status that organizations acquire and the one that they derive from their category affect their 
behavior. For example, future research can explore the interplay between the malleable 
achieved organizational status with the less malleable status that is transferred by affiliation to 
a high-status industry (Sharkey, 2014). 
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TABLE 1. INTERACTION BETWEEN ACHIEVED AND ASCRIBED STATUS 
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PAIR-WISE CORRELATIONS a 
 
  Variables Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Conductor conformity 0.31 0.06            
(2) Repertoire size b 0.71 0.30 -0.03           
(3) Big five orchestras 0.26 0.44 -0.03 0.58          
(4) Orchestra centrality b 0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.53 0.53         
(5) Conducting experience in the U.S. b 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.23 0.32 0.27        
(6) Conductor tenure at the orchestra b 0.07 0.07 -0.10 0.18 0.31 0.33 0.68       
(7) First year at the orchestra 0.12 0.32 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.24 -0.36      
(8) Num. of prior orchestras 0.30 0.57 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.12 0.63 0.01 0.01     
(9) Conational composer popularity 0.10 0.11 -0.13 -0.07 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.31 -0.06 -0.09    
(10) Preference toward conational composers b  0.33 0.51 -0.18 0.27 0.28 0.42 0.38 0.57 -0.22 -0.02 0.72   
(11) Achieved status 0.53 0.28 0.09 0.38 0.55 0.28 0.44 0.26 -0.08 0.36 -0.03 0.15  
(12) Ascribed status 0.17 0.38 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.19 0.12 0.19 -0.02 0.05 0.83 0.58 0.03 
 
 
a: The number of observations is 1031. |ρ| > 0.05 is significant at p < 0.05. 
 
b: Variables are re-scaled by 1/100 for ease of presentation of the regression coefficients. 
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TABLE 3. CONDUCTOR CONFORMITY a 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Repertoire size -0.023* (0.011) -0.023* (0.011) -0.024* (0.011) -0.024* (0.011) -0.025* (0.011) 
Big five orchestras 0.016+ (0.0096) 0.012 (0.0100) 0.0082 (0.0099) 0.0078 (0.0099) 0.0060 (0.0098) 
Orchestra centrality -1.21* (0.60) -1.14+ (0.61) -0.95 (0.62) -0.93 (0.62) -0.76 (0.63) 
Orchestra centrality squared 31.4 (35.4) 28.7 (35.3) 18.9 (35.9) 18.1 (35.8) 16.5 (35.9) 
Conducting experience in the U.S. -0.20* (0.078) -0.20* (0.078) -0.20** (0.077) -0.20** (0.077) -0.20** (0.077) 
Conductor tenure at the orchestra 0.061 (0.066) 0.044 (0.066) 0.034 (0.067) 0.034 (0.067) 0.013 (0.067) 
First year with the orchestra 0.012* (0.0058) 0.012* (0.0058) 0.012* (0.0058) 0.012* (0.0058) 0.013* (0.0058) 
Num. of prior orchestras 0.020+ (0.010) 0.017+ (0.010) 0.016 (0.010) 0.016 (0.010) 0.016 (0.010) 
Conational composer popularity 0.021 (0.14) 0.037 (0.14) 0.045 (0.14) 0.039 (0.14) 0.082 (0.15) 
Preference toward conational composers 0.0031 (0.011) 0.0037 (0.011) 0.0030 (0.011) 0.0031 (0.011) 0.011 (0.011) 
Achieved status × Ascribed status       -0.020 (0.043) 0.73*** (0.20) 
Achieved status squared × Ascribed status         -0.61*** (0.16) 
Achieved status   0.023 (0.015) -0.073 (0.066) -0.074 (0.066) -0.15* (0.068) 
Achieved status squared     0.088 (0.058) 0.091 (0.058) 0.16* (0.060) 
Observations 1031  1031  1031  1031  1031  
AIC -3248.3  -3248.6  -3249.5  -3247.7  -3260.4  
BIC -2714.9  -2710.3  -2706.3  -2699.6  -2707.3  
 
a: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed. +: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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TABLE 4. TESTING CURVILINEAR EFFECTS 
 
 
PANEL A. TESTING SLOPES AT MIN AND MAX POINTS BASED ON MODEL 5 
 
  At Minimum At Maximum 
German/Austrian (High-ascribed-status) 0.50** (0.17) -0.27** (0.10) 
Non-German/Austrian -0.12* (0.06) 0.16** (0.06) 
 
 
PANEL B. TESTING INFLECTION POINT BASED ON MODEL 5 
 
 
  
German/Austrian 
(High-ascribed status) Non-German/Austrian 
Range of Achieved status [0.08, 0.93] [0.08,1] 
Inflection point 0.64 0.47 
Std Error of the inflection point 0.04 0.06 
95% confidence interval (0.56, 0.72) (0.35, 0.59) 
 
 
 
TABLE 5. SPLIT SAMPLE 
 
 German/Austrians Only Non-German/Austrians Only 
Variables Model 6 Model 7 
Repertoire size -0.0058 (0.042) -0.025* (0.012) 
Big five orchestras 0.052 (0.034) 0.0045 (0.012) 
Orchestra centrality -2.31 (2.19) -0.39 (0.68) 
Orchestra centrality squared 113.9 (83.9) 6.08 (41.6) 
Conducting experience in the U.S. -0.71+ (0.43) -0.21* (0.085) 
Conductor tenure at the orchestra 0.54 (0.41) 0.027 (0.075) 
First year with the orchestra 0.0080 (0.017) 0.014* (0.0063) 
Num. of prior orchestras 0.046 (0.031) 0.020+ (0.012) 
Conational composer popularity -0.13 (0.30) 0.012 (0.21) 
Preference toward conational composers 0.00073 (0.018) 0.013 (0.016) 
Achieved status 0.51* (0.23) -0.16* (0.069) 
Achieved status squared -0.34+ (0.19) 0.16** (0.062) 
Observations 176  855  
AIC -529.1  -2713.2  
BIC -430.8  -2257.1  
 
a: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed. +: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p 
< .01; ***: p < .001 
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TABLE 6. RESULTS FROM HYBRID MODEL WITH CONDUCTOR RANDOM EFFECTS 
 
 
Full sample 
 
German/Austrians 
Only 
Non-
German/Austrians 
Only 
Variables Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Between effects       
Repertoire size 0.012 (0.017) -0.62** (0.22) 0.00017 (0.015) 
Big five orchestras 0.015 (0.012) -0.19 (0.18) 0.024* (0.010) 
Orchestra centrality -1.03 (0.64) 15.4 (9.90) -0.60 (0.58) 
Orchestra centrality squared 11.4 (28.9) -359.5 (301.3) -25.9 (32.2) 
Conducting experience in the U.S. -0.095 (0.17) -0.19 (1.34) -0.10 (0.14) 
Conductor tenure at the orchestra 0.14 (0.19) 0.26 (1.54) 0.075 (0.18) 
First year at the orchestra 0.0078 (0.017) 0.66** (0.22) -0.019 (0.020) 
Num. of prior orchestras 0.011 (0.016) 0.067 (0.069) 0.0098 (0.014) 
Conational composer popularity -0.040 (0.074) -0.94 (0.71) 0.088 (0.087) 
Preference toward conational composers -0.024 (0.018) 0.29+ (0.15) -0.069** (0.026) 
Ascribed status -0.039 (0.038)     
Achieved status × Ascribed status 0.31 (0.21)     
Achieved status squared × Ascribed status -0.27 (0.22)     
Achieved status 0.0020 (0.059) -0.069 (0.22) 0.0015 (0.051) 
Achieved status squared 0.0010 (0.057) -0.015 (0.27) 0.0032 (0.050) 
Within effects       
Repertoire size -0.018* (0.0079) -0.010 (0.027) -0.018* (0.0086) 
Big five orchestras 0.0041 (0.0076) 0.037 (0.030) 0.0028 (0.0090) 
Orchestra centrality -0.55 (0.49) -2.04 (1.69) -0.30 (0.53) 
Orchestra centrality squared 10.8 (26.8) 68.8 (64.1) 3.26 (31.0) 
Conducting experience in the U.S. -0.15* (0.062) -0.49 (0.39) -0.16* (0.068) 
Conductor tenure at the orchestra 0.0071 (0.052) 0.36 (0.39) 0.023 (0.058) 
First year at the orchestra 0.0097* (0.0041) 0.0062 (0.012) 0.011* (0.0045) 
Num. of prior orchestras 0.011 (0.0075) 0.030 (0.033) 0.015+ (0.0085) 
Conational composer popularity 0.058 (0.10) -0.033 (0.21) 0.0076 (0.16) 
Preference toward conational composers 0.0086 (0.0079) -0.0012 (0.013) 0.010 (0.012) 
Achieved status × Ascribed status 0.56*** (0.16)     
Achieved status squared × Ascribed status -0.47*** (0.13)     
Achieved status -0.11* (0.049) 0.42* (0.17) -0.12* (0.049) 
Achieved status squared 0.12** (0.043) -0.30* (0.14) 0.12** (0.044) 
Observations 1031  176  855  
 
a: All tests are two-tailed. +: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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FIGURE 1  
 
DISTRIBUTION OF CONDUCTOR CONFORMITY AND ACHIEVED STATUS BY 
HIGH AND LOW ASCRIBED STATUS & THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS BASED ON 
MODEL 5 IN TABLE 3 
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